In this track: Smart contract security foundations
advanced · 4 MIN READ

Frontend security versus contract security

A correct contract and a trustworthy interface are separate requirements.

LET’S PICTURE IT

A secure vault can still be reached through a misleading sign at the entrance.

SEE IT FOR YOURSELF
From a public address to a verified signatureStep 1 / 4
From a public address to a verified signaturePublic address0x0000…0001Share to receiveAnother personCan read the addressCannot sign for youPublic identifier ≠ secret authorizationLocal signerPrivate key stays hereSign the chosen requestSigned requestMessage + signatureSecret key not includedThe moving packet represents a signature, not a keySignatureCheck the exact messageCheck the signing contextVerificationAuthorization checkedIntent still mattersValidity and safety are different questionsWallet interfaceReads public dataRequests authorizationNetwork stateBalances and recordsIndependent verificationNo wallet is connected in this local illustration

An address is public receiving information. It is not the private key that authorizes actions.

Animated local teaching model. No wallet, RPC or live blockchain data. Some labels and hashes are abbreviated for readability.

Inspect what the interface prepares

A compromised frontend can supply an unintended target, spender, amount or signing domain. Contract correctness does not automatically make every prepared request safe.

Keep on-chain checks authoritative

Access control and invariants must hold for direct calls that bypass the interface. Hiding a dangerous option in the UI is not a contract restriction.

Validate user-visible context

Show network, account, action and permission scope clearly. Avoid claiming that a familiar token symbol or logo authenticates a contract address.

Review delivery and dependencies

Site deployment, scripts, DNS and account access affect interface trust. Threat-model the complete path from the user’s browser to the intended contract action.

Reason about the scenario

browser request → prepared target and calldata
wallet authorization → signed action
contract execution → enforced rules

Review every boundary.

Pseudocode or a simplified scenario for local reasoning. This is not a production contract or a completed security review.

QUICK CHECK · NO PRESSURE

Can users bypass frontend restrictions and call an exposed function directly?

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Original explanations by EtherTools. Examples are educational and source-linked; this site is independent of the Ethereum Foundation. Our approach.